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TRADE FRICTION WITH JAPAN AND THE 
AMERICAN POLICY RESPONSEt 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum * 
In Toyko recently I called upon an official of the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MIT!) to discuss trade frictions between the 
United States and Japan. On the way to my appointment I passed by 
Hibiya Park in the center of the city. About 10,000 people were gathered in 
a peaceful demonstration against any lifting of Japan's quotas on imports of 
agricultural products. Inside the MIT! building I asked the official whether 
the quotas on beef and oranges would be abolished soon. He told me they 
would eventually be liberalized or abolished to please the United States, 
but that political pressures were forcing the government to proceed very 
slowly. 
The situation seems unique. In an age when the policy of retaliatory 
protectionism is being officially embraced in countries around the world 
and the free trade ideal is under severe intellectual and political attack, 
Japan is moving to decrease protectionist barriers and to open its markets to 
foreign imports. Several questions naturally arise from this state of affairs: 
Why has Japan adopted this trade-liberalization stance? What measures 
are being adopted? Will the new policy really succeed in increasing access 
to Japanese markets for goods, sources) and investments from the United 
States and other countries?1 Finally, what larger lessons are there to be 
learned from our trade frictions with Japan? 
t My first exposure to the world of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the 
GATT) and the law concerning international trade was in 1963 in a course with Professor Eric 
Stein. His masterful exposition and quiet enthusiasm for the subject made a deep impression 
upon me. Even now I can recall the details of individual classes. I am glad to pay tribute to 
this most remarkable scholar and teacher who has given me so much over the years it has been 
my pleasure to know him. 
This Article was written as of December 1983. While this Article was in press, in April 
1984, the United States and Japan reached an agreement to (l) expand significantly the quotas 
on beef and agricultural products; (2) increase the import quotas on fruit puree, peanuts, 
tomato juice, and several other items; and (3) lower tariffs on 36 products including pork and 
tomato juice. See Japan, U.S. Reach Trade Compromise, The Japan Times, Apr. 26, 1984, at l, 
col. l (intl. ed.). 
• J.D. Michigan, 1965; Rusk Professor and Director of the Dean· Rusk Center of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, University of Georgia. - Ed. 
l. Several joint study groups, drawn from the private sector in both Japan and the United 
States, have been formed to consider trade problems between the two countries. The United 
States-Japan Trade Study Group (TSG), organized in 1977, consists of members of the Ameri-
can business community in Japan and Japanese businessmen and government people. Their 
excellent report, JAPAN BUSINESS: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter cited as 
JAPAN BUSINESS], provides a great deal of insight into Japanese markets. The Japan-U.S. 
Businessmen's Conference is comprised of the Advisory Council on Japan-U.S. Economic Re-
lations. Their report, AGENDA FOR ACTION (July 1983), is also very helpful. 
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I 
The new policy of trade liberalization in Japan is largely the result of 
external pressures brought to bear by the United States and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Western Europe. The large, increasing, and highly visible trade deficit 
between these countries and Japan has coincided with the recent world-
wide economic recession that has caused unemployment and decreasing 
profits in basic industries such as steel, autos, textiles, electronics and 
machine tools. Despite the manifest unfairness of ascribing these woes to a 
single cause, Japan has often been singled out by politicians and affected 
interest groups as the culprit responsible for this economic decline. As a 
result, two sorts of measures have been taken against Japan. First, protec-
tionist actions have been taken under the large body of U.S. trade laws as 
alleged retaliatory measures with the object of limiting Japanese imports in 
various sectors. Many of these protectionist actions are not compatible with 
the international law framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (the GAIT) and have thus tended to erode confidence in the entire 
world-wide trading system. Second, political and diplomatic pressure has 
been brought to bear on Japan to increase access to the Japanese market for 
foreign goods, services, and investment, to correct a perception that the Jap-
anese market has been artificially closed to foreign competition. 
An interesting facet of this situation is that this double strategy of action 
against Japan has been endorsed in the United States not only by tradition-
ally protectionist interest groups, but also, to a large extent, by private and 
governmental entities that have supported free trade values in the past. The 
free-trade groups concentrate on access to the Japanese market and justify 
protectionist measures as temporary punishments taken reluctantly to chas-
tise the Japanese Goliath into following the desired path of action. The 
vision behind this type of thinking is that once Japan liberalizes its markets, 
Yankee traders will swarm into the country selling American products. The 
streets of Tokyo will be clogged with Chevrolets and the traditional love for 
sashimi and eel will crumble in favor of a taste for American beef and pota-
toes. The traditional U.S. economic base will rise like a Phoenix from the 
ashes and we will return to the halcyon days of unquestioned U.S. eco-
nomic leadership. 
This ideal, which I exaggerate for emphasis, is obviously wrong-headed. 
Structural changes in the world's economy are occurring rapidly, and we 
cannot expect a return to an earlier status quo. Nevertheless, opportunities 
do exist for progress in reviving U.S. business and for making it more able 
to compete in international markets, including Japan. Unfortunately, our 
current policy of adopting protectionist measures (primarily against Japan) 
and railing against the closed nature of the Japanese market is not sufficient 
to allow us to take advantage of the opportunities presented. Our mis-
guided strategy vis-a-vis Japan is an example in microcosm of the bankrupt 
nature of our current policy. 
II 
Today the economies of Japan and the United States are intertwined to 
a degree unthought of even ten or fifteen years ago. The two-way trade in 
goods alone is expected to exceed $65 billion in 1984. Japan is by far the 
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United States' largest overseas trading partner, and is the major reason that 
the volume of our trans-Pacific trade now exceeds that of our trans-Atlantic 
trade. Japan takes ten percent of U.S. exports and we'take twenty-five per 
cent of Japanese exports. Trade in services with Japan is also important 
and is not reflected in the balance of trade statistics. In 1980, U.S. exports 
of services totaled $8.05 billion, while import~ amounted to $6.17 billion.2 
Of the 1,986 foreign affiliated companies operating in Japan in 1982, 671 
were American.3 In the chemicals, aircraft, pharmaceuticals, photographic 
supplies, wood products, electric measuring instruments, semiconductors, 
data processing, and coal products industries, U.S. companies hold at least 
a ten percent share of the Japanese market.4 
The success Japan has enjoyed in penetrating the American market is 
well known. Key examples include textiles, automobiles, steel, machine 
tools, cameras, televisions, and, recently, electronics. In virtually every in-
dustrial sector affected by-Japanese imports, protectionist measures have 
been applied. In the case of automobiles, the Japanese have been forced to 
limit their exports to 1.68 million units per year (1.85 million in 1984-1985). 
This quota was adopted as a "voluntary export restraint" agreement outside 
the framework of the GATT after the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion had, by a three-to-two vote, rejected an escape clause petition filed 
under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.5 In 1977, Japan and the United 
States negotiated a marketing agreement limiting the number of television 
sets exported into the United States.6 The U.S. steel industry has received 
the benefit of a whole series of protectionist measures. "Voluntary" export 
restraints were followed by the "trigger price" mechanism imposed in 1978 
2. JAPAN BUSINESS, supra note 1, at 5. 
3. A "foreign affiliated company" is defined by MIT! as one with at least 25% foreign 
participation. See JAPAN BUSINESS, supra note 1, at 7. 
4. JETRO, U.S. Exports, 1982 (1982). 
5. Under the escape clause, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982), any entity that is representative of a 
domestic industry can petition for relief from competition from imports. Petitions are submit-
ted to the International Trade Commission (ITC), which initiates investigations and holds 
public hearings to determine whether increased quantities of imports are a substantial cause of 
serious injury, or pose a threat of serious injury, to a domestic producer of a product similar or 
competitive with the imported product. If the ITC makes an affirmative finding, it submits a 
report to the President with reco=endations for import restrictions. 19 U.S.C. § 225l(d). At 
this point in the process, the President has a considerable degree of discretion as to what reme-
dial measures to apply. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982). Such measures can be unilateral, such as 
the imposition or increase of duties, tariff-rate quotas and quantitative restrictions; or the 
measures can be bilateral, such as orderly marketing agreements and trade negotiations. 19 
U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1982). 
In the case of automobiles, the ITC found there had been increased imports in cars and 
light trucks, but a majority determined that increased imports were not a substantial cause of 
injury. Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor; Report to the Presi-
dent, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,194 and 85,199 (1980). Nevertheless, voluntary export restraints were 
politically pursued and eventually self-imposed. For the announcement by MIT! of the re-
straints, see Announcement by Japanese Minister of International Trade & Industry on Auto 
Export Restraint Measures, May 1, 1981, U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 76, at N-1 (May 6, 
1981). On November 1, 1983, the voluntary quota agreement was extended for another year 
and set at a slightly higher figure of 1.85 million units. Quota on Japanese Cars Raised, Atlanta 
Constitution, Nov. 2, 1983, at 1, col. 1. 
6. Color Television Receivers Agreement, May 20, 1977, United States-Japan, 28 U.S.T. 
5262, T.I.A.S. No. 8626. 
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to bar imported steel at any price below a computed cost of products plus 
profit by Japan's most efficient producer.7 This "trigger price" was raised 
twelve percent in 1980, and in 1983 the section 201 escape clause was used 
by President Reagan to increase tariffs on stainless steel sheet, strip, and 
plate and to apply import tonnage quotas on stainless steel bar and rod and 
alloy steel.8 Pressure is now being brought to bear on the Japanese to limit 
exports of electronic equipment and semiconductors.9 U.S. industries and 
trade associations have in recent years used dumping and countervailing 
duty petitions to combat increased Japanese export competition. 10 
7. The trigger price mechanism (TPM) was instituted in 1978 as an alternative to the impo-
sition of duties or quotas in order to protect the economically distressed U.S. steel industry. 
When an imported steel product is sold at a price below the reference price established by the 
TPM, it "triggers" an antidumping investigation. See "Trigger Prices" for Imported Steel Mill 
Products, 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978). The basic data used to establish the reference prices were 
provided by MITI, which used data from six major Japanese steel companies and some small 
companies using electric furnaces. Id. MITI's figures were questioned by domestic producers 
and revised by a Treasury Department task force sent to Japan. See Revisions by Treasury 
Steel Trigger Price Task Force, 43 Fed. Reg. 32,710 (1978). 
The TPM was criticized for maintaining and encouraging higher prices while not contrib-
uting to the resuscitation of the U.S. steel industry. See Steel Imports and tire Administration of 
tire Anlidumping Laws: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of tire House Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 32-36 (1980) (statement by Robert W. Crandall, Senior Fellow, 
Brookings Institution); Note, Protecting Steel· Time for a New Approach, 96 HARV, L. REV, 
866 (1983). In January 1982, as unmollified steel producers were preparing to file unfair trade 
practice complaints against eleven countries, not including Japan, the Administration decided 
that the TPM was ineffective and would be immediately suspended. See Statement by Secre-
tary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige on the Steel Trigger Price Mechanism, Jan. 8, 1982, re-
printed in U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 110, at 351 {Jan. 13, 1982). It is interesting to note 
that for the first eight months of 1983, steel imports from developing countries have far ex-
ceeded imports from both Japan and the European Community. See LDC Imports in August 
Rise to Record Level as U.S. Firms Plan to File Cases, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 5 (Oct. 
5, 1983). 
8. The ITC reco=ended three years of import relief; the President, however, pressured 
by domestic industry leaders seeking a five-year period of relief, imposed a combination of 
quotas and tariffs over four years. See USTR and White House Statement on Special/)' Steel 
Relief, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 550 (July 6, 1983). 
9. In 1~83, the Semiconductor Industry Association released a report entitled THE EFFECT 
OF GOVERNMENT TARGETING ON WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR COMPETITION accusing the Japa-
nese of targeting the semiconductor industry, utilizing unfair tax subsidies, and limiting do-
mestic market access. 
MITI responded to these allegations by explaining that the theory of Japanese industrial 
policy is to encourage the development of private industry by lessening future uncertainty 
through the preparation of industrial forecasts, and when necessary, through incentives and 
regulation. MITI argues that Japanese policy is consistent with policies agreed upon within 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and that all states 
practice some form of industrial policy. It pointed out that the United States Department of 
Defense and NASA alone in 1982 spent greater than 5.04 trillion yen more on research than 
the Japanese government in 1980. See MITI's Yamanka Defends Japanese Government's Role 
in Industrial Policy, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 97 (Apr. 20, 1983). 
10. Antidumping and countervailing duty petitions initiate a process that is designed to 
identify unfair trade practices of dumping and subsidization and to remedy the effects of such 
practices on domestic competition. Dumping occurs when a domestic industry is injured by 
foreign products sold in the United States at "less than fair market value" (LTFV). The ap-
propriate remedy is the imposition of an antidumping duty to offset the difference between the 
imported value and the "fair value." 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1982). Subsidization occurs 
when a domestic industry is injured by imported goods that, with respect to manufacture or 
exportation, have been subsidized by the exporting country. The appropriate remedy is the 
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The cumulative effect of these protectionist actions, combined with simi-
lar measures adopted by European and other countries, is to short-change 
consumers who are denied the benefit of lower prices or the products they 
desire, to prop up declining industries artificially, to preserve existing ineffi-
ciencies, to retard innovation and necessary new investment, and to retard 
desirable structural changes in the world economy. They also wreak havoc 
on the institutions and principles of free trade upon which the postwar eco-
nomic prosperity was built and increase the threat of a 1930s-style trade 
war of mutual retaliation. The GAIT agreements and machinery are to-
tally insufficient to settle really important issues; nations use the GA TT 
only to claim their "rights", never to fulfill their obligations. 
III 
It may be objected, however, that these protectionist measures, while 
regrettable, are necessary counters to Japan, in particular, which engages in 
a concerted policy to close her domestic markets to foreign products while 
subsidizing and "targeting" exports. In this view "free trade" must give 
way to the principle of "fair trade." The brief carried against Japan con-
sists of several points: (1) that high tariff barriers are maintained in key 
industries; (2) that investments in and acquisitions of Japanese companies 
are controlled; (3) that quotas are maintained on certain products such as 
agricultural goods; (4) that certification and testing of imported products is 
capricious and cumbersome; (5) that government procurement discrimi-
nates in favor of domestic firms; (6) that trade in services is restricted; and 
(7) that government subsidies and the refusal to apply antitrust laws against 
Japanese companies allow "targeting" of exports in certain important 
.industries. 
In recent months Japan has responded in meaningful ways to virtually 
all these issues. With regard to tariffs, Japan began a liberalization pro-
gram in 1978 and in the past six years has gone from being a high tariff 
country to having the lowest tariff rate of any industrial country in the 
world. This process start~d in 1978, when Japan unilaterally made tariff 
imposition of a countervailing duty equal to the amount of the net subsidy. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-
167 lf ( 1982). 
Many of the petitions in recent years have been specifically directed at products that are 
imported primarily from Japan. Investigations have been initiated against such imported Japa-
nese products as television sets, see 41 Fed. Reg. 14,949 (1976), where the investigation was 
suspended without determination, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,949 (1976), probably due to the orderly 
marketing agreement, supra note 6; automobiles, see 40 Fed. Reg. 33,756 (1975), where the 
investigation was discontinued after a finding that neither Honda, Nissan, nor Toyota im-
ported their automobiles at less than fair value, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,986 (1976); steel products, see 
42 Fed. Reg. 56,403-05 (1977), where the petitions initiating the investigations were withdrawn 
in response to the institution of the trigger price mechanism,see 43 Fed. Reg. 9212 (1978); and 
industrial fasteners, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (1976), which led to the imposition of countervailing 
duties after a determination that promotional assistance by JETRO and tax deferrals through 
the Overseas Market Development Reserve constituted grants by the Japanese government, 42 
Fed. Reg. 23,146 (1977). In addition, an industry can tum to the escape clause; for example, 
when Harley-Davidson lost its antidumping case in 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,295 (1978), it initi-
ated and won a section 201 case. See Heavyweight Motorcycles, and Engines and Power Train 
Subassemblies Therefor, Report to the President on Investigation No. TA-201-47 under Sec-
tion 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, UNITED STATES INTL. TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 
1342 (Feb. 1983), reprinted in 4 INTL. TRADE REP. DECISIONS (BNA) 2469. 
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concessions on 2,600 industrial products and 200 agricultural products. Fur-
ther concessions were made in connection with the Tokyo Round in 1979 .11 
In 1982, as a result of a new negotiation, tariffs were again reduced thirty-
five percent on 1,635 items, including computers, plywood, heavy electrical 
machinery, automotive tires, medical and diagnostic instruments, steel, cos-
metics, drugs, and televisions. In 1983 another round of tariff reductions 
was implemented by the government.12 
In 1980, Japan took significant steps to allow foreign companies to take 
investment positions in Japan or acquire Japanese companies. Wholly-
owned foreign subsidiaries may now be more easily formed in Japan, and 
the approval system for foreign investment was changed to a prior notifica-
tion system under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. 13 
Japan also reduced the number of agricultural products subject to quo-
tas, although twenty-two agricultural products are still restricted, including 
some as to which the United States has a competitive advantage - e.g., 
beef, peanuts, and citrus fruits. 14 However, rising deficits incurred to sup-
port prices and consumer demand are now forcing Japan to rationalize and 
modernize its agricultural system. This is likely to involve increasing sup-
plies, lowering prices and raising import quotas. 
Japan is particularly concerned about charges that her customs clear-
ance, testing, and certification procedures inhibit the entry of foreign goods. 
U.S. exporters have complained of arbitrariness in valuing many commodi-
ties for customs purposes. 15 In 1979, Japan accepted the Customs Valuation 
11. Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Chang-
ing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, 320-21 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Matsushita]. 
12. DECREE OF THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE FOR ECONOMIC MEASURES: ON THE PRO• 
MOTION OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICIES, Jan. 13, 1983. Affected items totaled 323, includ-
ing some sensitive agricultural and manufactured products. Some of the tariffs are still 
relatively high. The tariff on cigarettes was decreased from 35% to 10% plus 342 yen/thousand 
units. In addition, the number of Japanese retailers that are allowed to handle imported to-
bacco was to be expanded from 20,000 to 50,000 in 1983, and all restrictions are to be lifted by 
1985. 
13. Gaikokukawase oyobi gaikokuboeki kanri ho (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law), Law No. 228 of 1949 (as amended by Law No. 65 of 1979, art. 52). Certain key 
areas such as agriculture and fisheries, oil, mining, and leather products are still restricted. 
14. The U.S. position is that these quotas are illegal under article XI of the GA TT since 
they are not implemented as a measure complementing regulations limiting domestic produc-
tion. The Japanese admit this is technically correct, but argue that the United States has done 
the same thing with the benefit of a GA TT waiver for§ 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 624 (1982). This section requires the administration to impose quantitative restric-
tions or special fees on imports that interfere with a farm program or substantially reduce the 
amount of product subject to such a farm program. 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1982). Article XI of the 
GA TT provides for the general elimination of quotas; therefore, § 22 of the Act is inconsistent 
with GAIT obligations. However, the U.S. obtained from the Contracting Parties an excep-
tionally broad waiver with no time limit and only an annual reporting requirement. The 
waiver was granted under article XI, which allows quotas on agricultural products in certain 
circumstances. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 32 (3d Supp. 1955). 
15. United Stales-Japan Economic Relations: Hearings and Markup on H. Con. Res. JoJ 
Before the Subcomms. on Asian and Pac!ftc Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1980). 
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Code of the Tokyo Round, and in 1981 amended the Customs TariffLaw16 
to replace its former valuation principle, under which a product was valued 
at the price of importation assuming perfect competition, with the GAIT 
code principles, under which primary reliance is placed upon the actual 
transaction value of an imported commodity.17 
Perhaps Japan's most important effort toward liberalizing trade has 
been to revise the procedures for and facilitate the testing and certification 
of imported products. This occurred in response to complaints by foreign 
business that inspection and certification standards were arbitrary, cumber-
some, and not based on international norms. 18 After ratification of the To-
kyo Round Standards Code, the government undertook a study of thirty 
laws on product standards and certification. On March 26, 1983, a Cabinet 
Decree19 was adopted requiring MITI, and other concerned ministries, to 
simplify testing, and proposing omnibus legislation to amend sixteen laws 
concerning standards.20 On May 19, 1983, the National Diet passed the 
omnibus bill.21 
As a result of these actions, technical barriers to exporting into Japan 
should be greatly reduced. The decree and omnibus law (1) enable foreign 
suppliers to apply for and obtain certification directly (formerly only the 
Japanese importer could do this); (2) require that foreign products and sup-
plies be treated equally with their domestic counterparts; (3) provide for the 
publication of all standards and for a comment period of nine weeks before 
they are declared effective; ( 4) provide for compliance with international 
norms in such items as electrical appliances, motor vehicles, and food addi-
tives; and (5) simplify the testing process by accepting foreign test results 
and allowing the testing of samples. 22 
16. Kanzei teiritsu ho (Customs Tariff Law), Law No. 54 of 1910 (as amended). 
17. Kanzei teiritsu ho no kaisei nikansuru horitsu (Law to Amend the Customs Tariff 
Law), Law No. 5 of 1981. The transaction value is the actual price paid or payable by the 
purchaser of the imported goods. There are other methods of obtaining customs valuation if 
the transaction value cannot be determined. See Matsushita, supra note 11, at 322. 
18. Professor Matsushita maintains that the standards and requirements are designed to 
meet domestic needs, not to discriminate against foreign products. He states that simple 
changes in administrative practices can remedy most of the complaints. Matsushita, supra 
note 11, at 325-26. 
19. ON IMPROVEMENT OF JAPAN'S STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEM, Mar. 26, 
1983. 
20. The following laws are affected: Ministry of International Trade and Industry - (1) 
Consumer Product Safety Law; (2) High Pressure Gas Control Law; (3) Electric Appliance 
and Material Control Law; (4) Law Concerning the Securing of Safety and Optimization of 
Transaction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas; (5) Measurement Law; (6) Gas Utility Industry Law; 
(/) Law Concerning the Examination and Regulation of Manufacture, etc., of Chemical Sub-
stances. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries - (1) Fertilizer Control Law; (2) 
Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Law; (3) Agricultural Chemical Regulation Law; (4) 
Law Concerning Safety Assurance and Quality Improvement of Feed; (5) Law Concerning 
Standardization and Proper Labelling of Agricultural and Forestry Products (JAS Law). Min-
istry of Health and Welfare - (1) Nutrition Improvement Law; (2) Pharmaceutical Affairs 
Law. Ministry ofTransport-(1) Road Vehicles Act; (2) Labour Safety and Sanitation Law. 
21. The Law to Amend a Part of the Related Laws to Facilitate the Obtaining of Type of 
Approval, etc., by Foreign Manufacturers, May 19, 1983. 
22. For a compilation and guide to standards for leading products, see JETRO: Outline of 
Standards and Certification Systems (1983). 
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In order to provide a mechanism to deal with complaints concerning the 
administration of trade standards and laws, the Japanese government estab-
lished an Office of Trade Ombudsman (O.T.O.) in 1982. The O.T.O. is 
composed of Vice Ministers of concerned governmental agencies and is 
headed by the Vice Minister of the Cabinet Secretariat. An Advisory Com-
mittee drawn from the private sector oversees its operation. Complaints 
concerning trade matters may be filed at any concerned ministry, Japanese 
consulates and embassies abroad, and with JETRO (the Japan External 
Trade Organization). The O.T.O. can take an affirmative action to remedy 
the situation, clear up misunderstandings or refuse to take any action. As 
of August I, 1983, 122 complaints had been received by the O.T.O. and 106 
cases were completed. Relief was granted in 32 cases and misunderstand-
ings were answered in 57 cases; in 17 cases no action was taken. The 
O.T.O. is proving to be an important vehicle for dealing with trade difficul-
ties, and its informal, extra-legal character conforms with the "Japanese 
way" of settling disputes.23 
Government procurement procedures have also been greatly liberalized 
in Japan to allow foreign participation in the bidding process. Cabinet Or-
der No. 300 of 1980 and the related Ministerial Ordinance stipulating spe-
cial procedures for government procurement of goods24 provide that open 
bidding, open to both domestic and foreign persons, shall be required ex-
cept in exceptional cases. In those cases the Ministry of Finance must be 
notified beforehand. In 1980, when American firms did not participate in 
the bidding to supply telecommunication equipment to the Nippon Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (NTT), the President of NTT requested the 
Department of Commerce to send a special notification to U.S. suppliers. 
A three-year Japan-U.S. intergovernmental agreement on NTT procure-
ment was concluded in December 1980.25 As a result, purchases by NTT 
from U.S. firms in fiscal year 1983-1984 are expected to reach $140 
23. See OFFICE OF TRADE OMBUDSMAN, PROGRESS REPORT ON O.T.O. COMPLAINTS 
PROCESSING (July 29, 1983). The O.T.O. complaint process is a typical example of Japanese 
dispute settlement procedures. After a complaint is filed, O.T.O. officials consult by telephone 
or in person with responsible officials. There are no formal hearings and it is not expected that 
parties will be represented by attorneys. Most of the disputes so far have involved testing and 
certification and customs valuation and classification. An illustrative complaint concerning 
testing was submitted by a U.S. producer of aerosol products who wished to have its products 
tested by a private independent facility to meet Japanese import standards. MITI responded 
to the complaint by allowing for the selection of a private test facility. Id. at 12 (O.T.O. Com-
plaint No. 94). Another example involved silicone dioxide, a common filtering agent for beer, 
which was not an approved food additive. This simple health regulation denied import certifi-
cation for beer imports; however, in response to a complaint, the Ministry of Health and Wel-
fare approved the substance, which in tum facilitated the importation of beer. Id. at 13 
(O.T.O. Complaint No. 107). A complaint about the length of time required for the approval 
of imports of cosmetics prompted the Ministry of Health and Welfare to shorten the period. 
Id. at 16 (O.T.O. Complaint No. 100), Complaints have also obtained changes in customs 
classification and valuation; for example, the Ministry of Finance reclassified paint roller cov-
ers, previously classified as "knitted goods" (16.8% duty rate), to "paint rollers" (10% duty 
rate). Id. at 13 (O.T.O. Complaint No. 103). 
Of the complaints received, 39 were from the United States, while 15 more complaints were 
filed by Japanese interests but involved products originating in the United States. Id. at 7. 
24. Minister of Finance Order No. 45 (Nov. 18, 1980). 
25. See Agreement on Government Procurement in Telecommunications, Dec. 19, 1980, 
United States-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 9961. 
April/May 1984) 
milli 26 on. 
Trade Friction with Japan 1655 
The Japanese market for services also appears open to foreign business. 
Foreign entities engaged in the banking, insurance, and securities busi-
nesses are expanding and capital restrictions are being liberalized.27 The 
United States-Japan Trade Study Group found that opportunities exist for 
entry into service markets in Japan, particularly in the areas of medical 
management, financial management, computer software, and truck leas-
ing.28 A problem in this regard is lawyers' services; liberalization of this 
sector is being discussed by representatives of the American Bar Associa-
tion and the Japan Federated Bar Association. 
A charge frequently made against Japan is that of "targeting" exports in 
certain industrial sectors with the aim of market domination. This label, 
chosen for its emotional impact, refers to the idea that Japan favors certain 
industries with subsidies and tax advantages. The charge of "targeting" has 
proven political appeal; in the last year more than thirty bills were intro-
duced in Congress to retaliate in some fashion against foreign trade barriers 
and subsidies. In December 1982, the Senate, at the behest of Houdaille 
Industries, Inc., adopted a resolution asking President Reagan to deny in-
vestment tax credits to U.S. companies that purchase Japanese computer-
ized machine tools.29 The U.S. is threatening the Japanese with 
countervailing duty proceedings over alleged targeting. 
The charge of targeting by Japan is most often heard in connection with 
high technology and microelectronics industries.30 Nevertheless, a U.S. 
26. See NIT Sees Greater U.S. Procurement, Japan Times, Oct. 7, 1983, at 7, col. 1 (Inter-
national Edition). The NTT is expected, however, to spend $3 billion on procurement in 1983-
1984, so the percentage of that total bought from American firms is low. On January 30, 1984, 
the 1980 intergovernmental agreement was renewed for another three years. Farnsworth, Ja-
pan-U.S. Trade Pact is Signed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1984, at D2, col. 4. 
27. See Lohr, U.S. Brokers Expand in Japan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1984, at DI, col. 3. 
Large U.S. banks are moving to get into the business of managing pension fund and other 
large investment portfolios in Japan. This field is dominated by eight Japanese banks. Several 
U.S. banks have formed joint ventures with Japanese securities houses and have asked the 
Ministry of Finance for approval to enter the trust banking market in Japan. See Chapman, 
Japan's Trust-Banking Allracts Americans, Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1984, at G3, col. 1. 
Under pressure from the United States, Japan has made some concessions to liberalize 
capital movements. In bilateral trade talks with the United States, Japan has agreed to: 
- eliminate a "real demand" rule that said banks must have commercial orders before 
they buy or sell forward yen; 
- change Japan's "designated company" rule that limits foreign stock ownership in cer-
tain companies; 
- submit a bill to allow the issuance of government bonds in foreign currencies overseas; 
- lower the minimum denomination for certificates of deposit; 
- raise the ceiling on the amount of CDs a bank can issue; 
- expedite a study on establishing a yen-based bankers' acceptance market; . 
- ease guidelines on Japanese companies' issuing of Euroyen bonds, which are yen-de-
nominated bonds held outside Japan; 
- and review Japan's withholding tax on interest earnings from Euroyen bonds held by 
nonresidents. 
Treece, U.S. May Come Under Fire This Week in Talks on Dollar-Yen Exchange Rate, Wall St. 
J.; Feb. 23, 1984, at 30, col. 1 (Midwest Ed.). 
28. JAPAN BUSINESS, supra note 1, at 57-102. 
29. S. Res. 516, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
30. See Cohen & Barrus, Gelling a Foothold in High-Tech Japan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 
1983, at 3F, col. 1. The authors state: 
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Embassy (Tokyo) study in 1982 concluded that computer hardware and 
software, electronic components, and bio-technology all have "good sales 
prospects" in the Japanese market.31 On October 6, 1983, Intel Corpora-
tion, a U.S. company that is the world's largest microprocessor maker, an-
nounced that its output capacity will be raised by about sixty percent over 
the next two years and, through its subsidiary Intel Japan, shipments will 
increase to a level of twenty percent of its total sales by the end of 1983.32 
Canon Sales Company recently announced that it has contracted with Ap-
ple Computer, Inc., to begin marketing Apple's personal computers in Ja-
pan.33 Japan and the United States have established a High Technology 
Work Group and a Data Collection System to keep each other informed of 
the current market situation in each nation. The two countries have agreed 
to eliminate tariffs on semiconductor products.34 
The issue of targeting involves a pointless debate over antitrust, tax, and 
subsidy policies in both countries.35 The antitrust laws may be stronger in 
the United States, but the decision to bring enforcement proceedings is 
highly discretionary in both countries. Japan may have more direct subsi-
dies of research and development, but U.S. subsidies may be even greater, 
although "hidden" in the budgets of NASA and the Department of 
Defense. 
This unique and powerful system of industrial policy, that included assured financing, 
cooperative research and development, Government encouragement and subsidy, and 
controlled, b~t vigorous internal competition, helped Japanese companies achieve mass 
production scale. A brilliant ability for production innovation led to world-scale quality 
and competitiveness. Assured financing and domestic competition in a protected home 
market led inexorably to overcapacity and the famous export drives, or as the Japanese 
call them, "a concentrated downpouring of exports." American pioneers of innovative 
technologies like solid-state television and numerically controlled machine tools found 
themselves out-produced in world markets almost before they recognized what was hitting 
them. 
31. JAPAN BUSINESS, supra note l, at 49-50. 
32. Semiconductor War Cooling Off, Japan Times, Oct. 7, 1983, at 7, col. 1 (International 
Ed.). 
33. Canon to Se11 Apple Computers in Japan, Japan Times, Oct. 7, 1983, at 7, col. 1 (Intl. 
ed.). 
34. Japan, U.S. Agree to Eliminate Semiconductor Import ,Duties, Japan Times, Nov. 9, 
1983, at 7, col 6 (Intl. ed.). 
35. See United States International Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its 
Effect on U.S. Industries, Phase L· Japan, Report to the Subcomm. on Trade of the House 
Comm on Ways & Means on Investigation No. 332-162 Under Section 332b of the Tar(!f Act of 
1930, UNITED STATES INTL. TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 1437 (Oct. 1983). This report, 
which is very well done and contains comprehensive data on the topic, does not come to any 
clear-cut policy conclusions. 
"Targeting," in the sense of government support for particular industries that have poten-
tial for development and success in international markets, is very similar to the concept "na-
tional insurance policy" which is proposed by many for the United States. Legislation to 
combat "targeting" would be counterproductive. "Targeting" is not one policy but a diffuse 
group of often ad hoc decisions involving subsidies, antimonopoly law exemptions, and an 
almost limitless variety of other government aids. Any decision to retaliate against "targeting" 
would be political rather than legal because the concept defies legal definition. It would also 
be "overkill" since the U.S. already has legislation to combat elements of "targeting" such as 
subsidies which are subject to countervailing duties. Furthermore, the charge of "targeting" 
could easily be raised by other countries against the United States, provoking retaliatory legis-
lation and protectionism. 
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Three conclusions are manifest from the foregoing discussion. First, the 
Japanese market is open to foreign goods, services, and investments to a 
remarkable degree, insofar as formal and legal barriers are concerned. Sec-
ond, American penetration of the Japanese market is much greater than is 
commonly supposed.36 Third, there is a great deal of cooperative effort 
between the United States and Japan to work on and solve common 
problems. · 
Yet the trade frictions between Japan and the United States remain. 
Will they substantially diminish once the important measures Japan has 
taken to open markets and facilitate imports have had time to take effect? 
These measures will certainly make a difference and recent Japanese ac-
tions represent new opportunities for American business with the skill and 
determination to take advantage of them - but the opening of the Japanese 
market alone will not be a panacea to solve the economic problems in the 
United States. 
Elementary analysis should tell us why this is so. The U.S. deficit with 
Japan is now over $20 billion and has been steadily increasing despite the 
fact that Japanese tariff barriers have been relatively low since 1978. Im-
provements in testing, standards, and certification, and in foreign access to 
government procurement contracts are not likely to make the massive dif-
ference needed in order to lower substantially the trade imbalance between 
the two countries. Even total elimination of all quotas on agricultural prod-
ucts will not tum the tide. It is estimated that if Japan abolished all such 
quotas the result would be to increase American sales of agricultural prod-
ucts to Japan by about $1 billion per year.37 Other countries such as Aus-
tralia would provide powerful competition with the United States for a 
share of the Japanese agricultural market. . 
By the same token, present U.S. policies dealing with the trade imbal-
ance with Japan are largely wrong and self-defeating. The retaliatory pro-
tectionist moves aimed at bilateral trade imbalances, in the form of requests 
for orderly marketing agreements and voluntary restraints, impede world 
economic progress, penalize the American consumer, and hurt the multilat-
eral trading system. They should be used, if at all, only as temporary ad-
justment devices. They should also be rationalized within the GATT 
system as safeguard measures and not allowed to proliferate independently 
of internationally recognized norms of conduct. The U.S. trade laws con-
cerning dumping, countervailing duties, and the escape clause should be 
carefully reexamined in view of their use for protectionist purposes in re-
cent years. Legitimate applications to combat direct subsidies of exports 
and unfair pricing should be preserved, but new criteria should be formu-
lated to eliminate protectionist uses. 
Another faulty American policy is to object to all Japanese governmen-
tal interventions - whether in the form of administrative guidance, subsi-
dies, tax advantages, or permission for groups of companies to pool their 
36. About 50,000 U.S.-made products are currently available in Japan. JAPAN BUSINESS, 
supra note 1, at 1 
37. AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 92. 
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efforts to develop new technologies - as somehow illegitimate. Japan's 
continued economic strength is the dir~ct result of her ability to ride the 
crest of the wave of structural changes in the world economy and to adjust 
by moving into higher quality, improved, value-added products and serv-
ices. Both business and government have participated in making these nec-
essary adjustments, a process of continued adaptation to social and 
industrial change. The Seiko Group, for example, is successfully making 
the transition from watches and clocks to integrated circuits and computers. 
The competitive advantage for watches and clocks has moved to other 
countries, but the company is still strong. Another company, Toray Indus-
tries, was originally a manufacturer of synthetic textiles. This industry, 
once one of Japan's main export industries, has moved to other countries 
like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea. Toray has moved into plastics and 
specialized chemical products; its textile operations have been narrowed 
and modernized, centering in high-quality long synthetic fibers. 
These changes have been facilitated by government interventions in the 
form of tax advantages and administrative guidance. We should not object 
to such government measures when they are for the purpose of structural 
modernization. We should condemn them only when they are for the pur-
pose of artificially preserving a declining industry whose competitive ad-
vantage is elsewhere. We should recognize that government intervention is 
sometimes necessary as an alternative to protectionism. Declining basic in-
dustries, on the other hand, should be exposed to the crucible of interna-
tional competition. They will not disappear, but they will be forced to 
modernize and compete. 
The key fact that we must realize is that the trade frictions between the 
United States and Japan are not caused by formal barriers to the Japanese 
market alone. More significantly, we must recognize and adapt our policies 
to structural changes sweeping over the world economy. These changes are 
the result of many complex factors: the interdependence of national econo-
mies due to the communications revolution and the success of the post-war 
trading system; new technological developments in computers and other 
areas; the rise of the developing nations; and the change in the price of oil 
and energy. · 
The United States economy, still the world's most advanced and pro-
ductive, has felt the shock of these structural changes. Traditionally strong 
basic industries such as steel, autos, textiles, and chemicals have languished 
while growth has occurred in the service sector of the economy and in a 
wide variety of newer high technology industries. In Western Europe the 
process has been much the same. Japan has been the major heir to primacy 
in the basic industries sector of the world economy. Its success in steel and 
autos is well known. In 1983, Japan also took over world leadership in the 
machine tools industry, a basic standard for measuring economic success 
since machine tools are a basic driving price in the economy, ultimately 
responsible for every other manufactured product. Japan also became the 
world's number one appliance exporter in 1983, and its production ranks 
second to the United States. · 
The Japanese economy has matured, however, and there are signs that it 
will follow the path of the United States and Europe. Already services are 
becoming more important, and over half the employed population is now in 
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the service industries. The number of agricultural workers is decreasing; as 
people come into the cities from the rural areas, Japan faces problems of 
unemployment and job creation. Many basic industries are now languish-
ing in Japan. In textiles, watches, shipbuilding, chemicals, and nonferrous 
metals there is increasing competition from abroad, particularly by the 
leading edge of the developing countries of the world. Even the vaunted 
Japanese steel industry has been hard-hit by the competition from South 
Korea, Brazil, and Venezuela. Not only have exports decreased but foreign 
steel has captured a significant share of the Japanese market, causing steel 
industry executives to call for quotas and marketing agreements directed at 
major competitors. In addition, there are calls in Japan to begin dumping 
and countervailing duty proceedings against steel imports and commodities 
from Pakistan and other countries.38 Budgetary deficits are also a problem 
in Japan, raising the spectre of inflation; there are calls for reducing govern-
mental expenditures as in the United States. 
Our problems with Japan and our larger economic difficulties can be 
dealt with only if business and government in the United States understand 
and accommodate the structural changes occurring in the world's economy. 
There are several points to consider here. First, we must recognize that 
traditional reliance upon demand management through fiscal and monetary 
policies will not be sufficient alone to the task we face. Because of continu-
ing budgetary deficits in the United States and other countries, there is little 
room for use of fiscal policy to support demand. Similarly, continuing in-
flationary pressures place constraints on such a use of monetary policies. 
The United States should therefore adopt, and encourage other countries to 
take affirmative steps to promote, smooth structural adjustment based upon 
the market mechanism. This need not be anything so grandiose as "indus-
trial policy," which implies detailed governmental intervention in every 
sector of the economy. Rather, we may adopt new economic policies aimed 
at fine tuning and structural adaptation, such as worker retraining, a coor-
dinated strategy for all federal research and development funding, a ration-
alization of existing tax benefits and subsidies, rethinking antitrust policy in 
terms of the necessity to reduce market rigidities and structural imbalances, 
and export promotion assistance. 
Second, we must work to reaffirm and reinvigorate the international free 
trading system. Using protectionist instruments to retard structural change 
is a destructive and, in the long run, futile effort to preserve the status quo. 
Our trade policies have been aimed in the wrong direction, discouraging 
needed economic adjustments. 
Third, both government and business must strive to design their strate-
gies and policies in an international perspective. We can no longer think in 
terms of the domestic market alone but must consciously participate in the 
international economy on every level, as do other countries such as Japan. 
Our huge trade deficit is primarily due to the high value of the dollar in 
relation to other currencies and the cut-backs on imports by countries strug-
gling with large international debts. In formulating• our monetary and fiscal 
38. Although Japan accepted the Subsidies Code of the Tokyo Round under the GAIT, it 
has never used dumping or countervailing duty concepts against imported products. Matsu-
shita, supra note 11, at 322-23. 
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policies, therefore, we should give more consideration to the fact that high 
interest rates tend to overvalue the dollar in currency trading, inhibiting 
exports and causing higher unemployment. We should also give more at-
tention to the economic problems of the developing world and not hesitate 
to increase contributions to the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank where needed to sustain the world economy. 
American business too should internationalize its product development 
and marketing strategies. Exporting is no longer an exotic business activity 
but is necessary to the economic health of our nation. Exports will be a 
major source of business profits and job creation in the future. An example 
of this is the new opportunity for selling in Japan. 
Japan is now the largest market for consumer goods in the world next to 
the United States. Surveys have shown that the Japanese are highly sophis-
ticated about their choice of goods to buy, but that seventy percent do not 
discriminate between foreign goods and domestic goods during shopping.39 
Now that Japan has reduced the formal and legal barriers to her markets, 
American companies should strive to overcome the remaining barrier -
the different business and legal cultural milieu of Japan. 
The Japanese market poses a challenge to American business because of 
the immense difference in culture between the two countries. This produces 
both a gap in communication and misunderstandings. It is the responsibil-
ity of the American business community, as well as Japan, to move to un-
derstand and overcome these problems. We should train a new corps of 
business and legal specialists with knowledge of Japanese language and cul-
ture. We may ask the Japanese to change their attitudes where appropriate, 
but more importantly, it is our responsibility to understand and adapt to the 
"Japanese way" of doing business. 
The Japanese often act very slowly and cautiously in a business rela-
tionship. This fact is often a source of frustration. We should recognize, 
however, that this stems to some degree from the Japanese style of internal 
decisionmaking, which is a "bottom-top," consensus approach. It is also 
the result of the Japanese emphasis on establishing good human relations 
and a fundamental bond of trust and sincerity before entering into a busi-
ness relationship. They are repelled by the more legalistic, adversarial way 
of dealing Americans are used to. American firms will find that the Japa-
nese are slow to come to a decision, but no one is more reliable and prompt 
in implementing and adhering to a decision once taken. 
Another problem Americans find in Japan is that the distribution sys-
tem is, by our standards, complex and lengthy. This makes marketing in 
Japan difficult and expensive. Foreign companies that have had success in 
Japan have overcome this obstacle in one of two ways: they have found 
reliable Japanese partners and concluded sole distributorship agreements or 
they have invested the time and resources into creating their own distribu-
tion network, often operating outside of the usual Japanese channels. It is 
inevitable that, as the Japanese economy matures, distribution channels will 
39. MANUFACTURED IMPORTS PROMOTION COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
CONFERENCE, AN ANALYSIS OF AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE JAPANESE DISTRI• 
BUTION SYSTEM AND BUSINESS PRACTICES 5 (1983) (Summary of Report). 
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become more streamlined and more efficient. This process is already at 
work. 
American and European business is at the threshold of a great opportu-
nity to be successful in the large and lucrative Japanese market. A combi-
nation of the process of modernization and government import promotion 
campaigns are changing Japanese buying habits and attitudes. In the fu-
ture Japan will be receptive to products tailored to Japanese demand for 
performance, style, and quality. As in the United States and Europe, the 
Japanese are developing a taste for imported products. Foreign companies 
will be successful if they have the patience to make the investment of 
money and time necessary to take advantage of this. 
Finally, it is important in our dealings with Japan to recognize that the 
notion of "Japan, Inc.," perpetrator of a giant conspiracy to take advantage 
of the world trading system in order to dominate world markets while clos-
ing its own doors, is unequivocally and demonstrably false. The Japanese 
are "indeed formidable competitors, but they are acting fairly and respon-
sibly as part of the international business community. In a very real sense, 
we are indebted to Japan and her enormous productivity and vitality. The 
Japanese challenge has in large measure shaken us out of our economic 
lethargy. We are reshaping and rethinking our own economic future in 
basic ways that will contribute to the future growth and productivity of our 
society. We must continue on this path and resist calls for action that, in the 
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